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a b s t r a c t
This paper describes how mobile device apps can inadvertently broadcast personal information through
their use of wireless networks despite the correct use of encryption. Using a selection of personas we
illustrate howappusage canbe tied to personal information. Userswould likely assume the confidentiality
of personal information (including age, religion, sexuality and gender) when using an encrypted network.
However, we demonstrate how encrypted traffic pattern analysis can allow a remote observer to infer
potentially sensitive data passively and undetectably without any network credentials.
Without the ability to read encrypted WiFi traffic directly, we process the limited side-channel
data available (timings and frame sizes) to enable remote app detection. These side-channel data
measurements are represented as histograms and used to construct a Random Forest classifier capable of
accurately identifying mobile apps from the encrypted traffic they cause. The Random Forest algorithm
was able to correctly identify apps with a mean accuracy of∼99% within the training set.
The classifier was then adapted to form the core of a detection program that could monitor multiple
devices in real-time. Tests in a closed-world scenario showed 84% accuracy and demonstrated the ability
to overcome the data limitations imposed by WiFi encryption. Although accuracy suffers greatly (67%)
whenmoving to an open-world scenario, a high recall rate of 86% demonstrates that apps can unwittingly
broadcast personal information openly despite using encrypted WiFi. The open-world false positive rate
(38% overall, or 72% for unseen activity alone) leaves much room for improvement but the experiment
demonstrates a plausible threat nevertheless.
Finally, avenues for improvement and the limitations of this approach are identified. We discuss
potential applications, strategies to prevent these leaks, and consider the effort required for an observer
to present a practical privacy threat to the everyday WiFi user. This paper presents and demonstrates a
nuanced and difficult to solve privacy vulnerability that cannot not be mitigated without considerable
changes to current- and next-generation wireless communication protocols.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
WiFi communications are now an everpresent part of mod-
ern society; pervading homes, business and almost everything be-
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tween. The availability of WiFi and cellular data plans has led to
an explosion of popularity in mobile devices (phones and tablets)
and the apps that run on them. As will be discussed in Section 2,
the ability to infer information about encrypted communications
via side-channels has been previously established, as have the pri-
vacy implications of persistently carrying personal mobile devices
and the potential security risks of particular apps and services.
However, this paper demonstrates how the three in combination
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present a perfect storm making users’ private and sensitive in-
formation vulnerable. This information can be leaked to any lis-
tening party within reception range of the wireless network. The
observer can operate despite WiFi encryption working exactly as
designed, requires no access credentials, and can perform the anal-
ysis on commodity hardware. The technique is therefore remote,
passive, undetectable and inexpensive.
To demonstrate this, 34 highly-ranked apps were chosen and
the target demographics of their users identified. Network data
was then collected as the apps were opened. This network activity
denotes the use of a particular app. However, due to encryption
only limited information is available in the form of side-channels.
Interpretations of frame size and interarrival time characteristics
were used to create histograms detailing the distribution of these
metrics over a given time period. The distributions can then
be used to differentiate between samples of encrypted network
activity from different apps. These distributions were labelled
appropriately and used by a Random Forest machine learning
algorithm to produce a classifier that predicts app usage (or
lack thereof) based on samples of encrypted network activity.
The Random Forest was then converted to compiled code for
speedy analysis of data in real-time. Personas were created to
emulate different people, possible app choices, and thenmonitored
in real-time to demonstrate how personal information can be
leaked.
The methods used to identify apps could also be used to
‘fingerprint’ other activity over encrypted communications (e.g.
VoIP, websites). However, the personal ties of mobile apps, an
openly ranked market with relatively low diversity (compared
to website fingerprinting in other work), and ease of collection
make apps a particularly opportune and vulnerable target.
Although the processes in this paper are demonstrated using
standard 802.11g WiFi, the methods should generalise to other
wireless communications protocols unless they are specifically
designed to resist this type of analysis. Notably for mobile apps,
the measurements used to perform this analysis will also be
present in longer range protocols like 4G LTE in cellular phone
networks.
1.1. Scenario and the WiFi environment
The scenario presented here will be familiar to all readers:
a mobile device connects to a WiFi Access Point (AP) providing
internet access. The apps on the device may then use this
connection to communicate with certain remote internet servers.
Information from these servers is used to provide the app’s content
or functionality. Although reliant on an internet connection, this
centralised architecture minimises the storage and processing
power required by the device itself. Devices can therefore be
smaller, cheaper, and provide up-to-date content or backups
whenever connected. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 3.2,
we found that even those apps that only provide static local
content may still use the internet connection to some degree
when available. In our scenario the AP provides an 802.11g WiFi
network utilising industry standard encryption (i.e. WPA2-PSK or
WPA2-Enterprisewith EAP) so only authorised users can access the
network.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, our adversary is a remote observer
attempting to infer information about the users of mobile devices
connected to an AP. As the observation process is entirely passive,
the observer is completely undetectable by the user or network
operator. They are not necessarily malicious but have no access to
thenetwork’s credentials or security keys, nor do they ever attempt
to crack or discover them. As will be discussed in Section 6, the
methods presented in this paper can be adapted for a variety of
purposes including virtuous ones.
Fig. 1. Observing encrypted mobile device WiFi traffic.
1.2. Contributions
This paper details the following contributions:
1. An explanation of how sufficient information can be extracted
from external observations of encrypted WiFi traffic to identify
specific user activities. We describe how timing and frame size
measurements over a short time period can be interpreted
as histograms. The values of these histogram bins drive
classification via machine learning. Despite the highly data-
limited scenario this information can be used to accurately
‘fingerprint’ different activities from a remote, unprivileged
vantage point.
2. We apply this fingerprinting technique to a selection of widely-
used mobile apps and construct a Random Forest capable of
accurately identifying these apps from the encrypted activity
they cause. We collect on-device traffic and then convert the
measurements to how it would appear from the perspective of
a remote, unprivileged observer. The Random Forest algorithm
was able to correctly classify apps with mean accuracy of∼99%
for this training set.
3. Due to the highly personalised nature of many mobile apps, we
show that the ability to fingerprint these appswithout breaking
encryption can leak private information. A selection of personas
demonstrate how personal information can be linked to the
apps people use. The average user is unlikely to realise that such
information is potentially being broadcast when they use these
apps despite encryption working exactly as designed.
4. We demonstrate that the app identification process is efficient
enough to allow real-timemonitoring ofmultiple devices. Using
the classifier developed from the training data, a live, remote
detector program is developed and its performance in an open-
world and closed-world scenario is assessed. The closed-world
showed good performance (84% accuracy) and demonstrated
the ability to overcome the data limitations imposed by
WiFi encryption. Furthermore, the ability to adapt signatures
generated from (easier to collect) on-device samples to function
from an external vantage point was verified. Although accuracy
suffers greatly (67%) when moving to an open-world scenario
where previously unseen network activities are introduced, a
high recall rate of 86% (denoting correct identification of an app
providing the app was active) demonstrates the ability for apps
to broadcast personal information despite WiFi encryption.
The open-world false positive rate (38% overall, or 72% for
unseen activity alone) leaves much room for improvement but
demonstrates a plausible threat nevertheless.
5. Applications, limitations, potential avenues of improvement
and strategies to prevent theseWiFi leaks are identified. Finally,
we assess the cost and effort required for an interested observer
to present a practical privacy threat to the everyday WiFi
user.
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1.3. Paper outline
The next section (Section 2) summarises the related work
providing the foundation for this study: wireless network security,
mobile devices and app privacy, and inference of information
using only side-channels. Section 3 describes the mobile app
selection process, how their activity was measured, and details
the construction of the Random Forest classifier that was capable
of operating from such a unprivileged vantage point. Section 4
reports the resultant classifier’s accuracy onour sample data before
evaluation on low-cost hardware in the real-world. Section 5
then explains the creation of personas representing real-world
users and subsequent testing in closed- and open-world scenarios
to demonstrate how app usage detection can betray sensitive
information. The implications and practicality of these findings
are then discussed in Section 6 before the paper is concluded in
Section 7.
2. Research background
2.1. Wireless networks and security
WiFi is now almost ubiquitous in the developed world. Its
pervasive deployment saturates residential, industrial, business
and government buildings alike. Wireless networks are so
prevalent that utilising broadcasts of nearby APs to pinpoint the
location of the receiver is a common feature of modern mobile
devices [1,2]. Although broadcast over a wide area, encryption
is used to keep WiFi communications confidential. However, the
assumption that unbroken encryption hides your activities is
largely unchallenged outside of academic circles. This is certainly
not the case given a motivated adversary and, as will be discussed,
the effort required to perform such an analysis is perhaps rather
low.
For purposes of compatibility, network protocols conceptually
– although not always in practice – follow the OSI model [3]. This
model denotes how protocols are separated into layers with spe-
cific responsibilities. Data of higher layer protocols is encapsu-
lated within those below. The WiFi standard (IEEE 802.11 [4]) was
adapted from the wired Ethernet standard (IEEE 802.3 [5]) and re-
defines the Physical layer (from a copper wire medium to 2.4 GHz
radio broadcast) and Data Link layer (defining appropriate access
control and collision detection for the new medium). Protocols in
the layers above remain entirely unaffected so hardware and soft-
ware does not need to be rewritten for every possible combination
of protocols. For example, your web browser will fetch a web page
using HTTP over TCP over IP regardless of whether a physical LAN
or WiFi is used at lower layers. Internet-enabled smartphone apps
are similarly agnostic as to whether they are connected via WiFi
or the cellular data network for the same reason [6]. However, this
results in a situation where protocols can operate in environments
where the assumptions they were designed under may no longer
apply. Data, activity patterns or other information can be exposed
in ways the original implementers did not consider.
For the sake of confidentiality, WiFi networks should there-
fore employ an encryption scheme to prevent data being read di-
rectly. Even though the addition of encryption greatly improves
security, WiFi still presents a large and accessible target to po-
tential eavesdroppers. Communications can now be observed and
recorded over a great distances where physical access and a literal
wire-tap would have been required previously. Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP), the first widely deployed WiFi encryption scheme,
is therefore a misnomer. The security of physical and wireless net-
work communications are not equivalent at all. Should an encryp-
tion scheme contain a flaw (as they have in the case of bothWEP [7]
and the original WPA [8]) then communications can be decoded
easily, remotely and usually without trace.
In this paper we make no attempt to find or exploit flaws
to break WiFi encryption directly. Instead we show what can be
determined despite encryption working perfectly as designed. In
an environmentwith correctly implemented encryption, users and
network operators would be excused for assuming that privacy
and confidentiality were assured unless the secret keys were
discovered. We demonstrate that this is not the case.
2.2. Mobile devices and mobile app privacy
The abundance of private information stored onmodernmobile
devices is well-established [9]. Following the jump from ‘dumb
phones’ to smartphones, mobile devices suffer from the same
threats that previously targeted personal computers and are privy
to the same personal data. As useful services are added to mobile
platforms,malware that exploits these services and the data stored
is soon to follow. This malware performs all the activities one
would expect. For example; stealing personal data, sending spam,
or ransomware. An interesting twist on the spambusinessmodel is
to generate revenue by calling premium-rate numbers or sending
SMS [10]. Similarly, the propensity to install apps on mobile
devices rather than visit a website, plus easy-to-use virtual ‘app
stores’ or ‘markets’, means installing software onmobile devices is
easy and routine. This is in stark contrast to traditional computers
where installing specialised software just to see a particular news
source or check the weather seems very far-fetched. Given the
wealth of personal information and functionality that could be
available to unrestricted programmes, great efforts have been
made to set up permissions systems to regulate app behaviour
[10,11].
Modern Mobile devices are undeniably a huge repository of
personal information. Seneviratne et al. explored this fact and
found that they were able to identify personal traits such as
gender, religion and ethnicity app identification with accuracy
approaching 90% [12,13]. This paper attempts the same inferences,
but without privileged access to the mobile device’s files, or even
the network it is operating on. We must attempt to identify the
apps from fully encrypted WiFi traffic first.
The mobile aspect of these devices adds further privacy risks.
The most efficient methods of routing network communications
rely upon the easy and unique identification of the sender
and recipient. These and similar unique identifiers pervade
unprotected network communications [14]. Even from an external
vantage point with WiFi encryption enabled, MAC addresses that
uniquely identify devices are still freely broadcast. Commercial
interest in wireless broadcasts has piqued in recent years with
companies recognising them as a potentially huge data source
for the multi-billion dollar Customer Relationship Management
market. London’s controversial ‘‘tracking bins’’ that included
hardware to collect WiFi-enabled device identifiers as owners
passed in the street to track their movements [15], and Westfield
Groups’ programme to perform similar shopping habits analysis
with mobile phone identifiers [16]. Furthermore, mobile devices
may also actively search for familiar APs and in doing so may
broadcast the names (SSIDs) of recently used networks. These can
be located using the samedatabases that aidmobile GPS navigation
to determine the home, workplace and other locations important
to the user of a mobile device [17]. Disposable Network IDs would
work to inhibit analysis of this kind [18] and while it would make
tracking specific users between sessionsmuch harder, it would not
prevent the analysis presented in this paper.
The privacy threat of external tracking and the security
of personal data held on mobile devices is often considered
separately. In our scenario these two concerns are combined. We
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demonstrate how it is possible to exploit WiFi side-channels to
infer private user information without the need for a privileged
position within the network or on the device. This renders
safeguards like app permissions and encryption irrelevant. The
distance over which this analysis can be performed may also
be much greater than expected. Although most commodity WiFi
devices have a range of up to 100 m, this is with omnidirectional
antenna and includes the need to transmit. With increased
signal strength and directional antenna, WiFi networks using
have been operated effectively point-to-point over hundreds of
kilometres [19]. While most WiFi hardware is of course incapable
of this, the observer in our scenario only needs to receive
transmissions.
2.3. Side-channels & private information inference
Side-channel analysis is famed for its use in breaking encryption
but remains ‘‘an often-overlooked threat’’ [20]. Power analysis
of Data Encryption Standard (DES) hardware [21] and timing
analysis of the RSA algorithm [22] leaked enough information
about the state of the encryption processes to undermine them.
These side-channel leaks reliably allowed the secret keys used in
the encryption process to be deduced in a very short time and
therefore rendered the algorithms insecure.
However, aswe demonstrate in this paper, side-channels do not
have to be used to ‘crack’ encryption directly to reveal sensitive
information. Observing the older implementations of the SSH
login protocol showed that password length could be deduced
from the size of the packets sent to the server and padding was
added to secure the process [23]. The anonymity-preserving Tor
network also added methods to obfuscate the timing and size
characteristics of traffic after it was shown that visiting certain
websites could be ‘fingerprinted’ [24,25]. Similarly, Chen et al. [26]
investigated HTTPS side-channel leaks for secure cloud services
handling personal healthcare and tax information. They found
that ‘‘side-channel information leak is a realistic and serious
threat to user privacy’’. Another study found that it was possible
to deduce certain categories of Google search despite the user
connecting over encryptedHTTPS to a distributed Content Delivery
Network [27].
In mobile-specific work, Stöber et al. [28] looked to identify
the apps signified by variations in their ‘sync’ (regular update)
activity on Android devices. Using the same side-channels as this
study, they were able to reliably identify which apps were being
sync-ed on the device. However, the number of apps this method
applies to is restricted to only the relatively few apps that use the
syncmechanism. However, all these studies are undertaken from a
position within the network. While the challenges in dealing with
encrypted traffic are similar, any adversarymust have a position of
privileged access like that of a network administrator or Internet
Service Provider. Observing passively from a perspective external
to the network, Zhang et al. [29] found they were able to classify
broad categories of encrypted WiFi traffic (e.g. video streaming,
web browsing) and Atkinson et al. [30,31] showed it was possible
to specifically target Skype traffic for identification.
Other studies examined inference one step further. In some
cases it is possible to infer not just a private activity, but also
what personal information can be inferred from that activity.
For example, it was shown that the tiny but frequently updated
information from ‘Smart Grid’ power meters could be used to
not only infer the appliances used [32], but also how the usage
of these appliances could then ‘leak’ further information about
occupants’ behaviour. For example;meal times,working hours and
TV habits. Going even further, the authors hypothesise that certain
behaviours can be correlatedwith predictable social timings – such
as church or bar opening times – to expose even greater depths of
private information [33].
Similar analysis can be performed on network communications.
Impressively, White et al. [34] were able to not only accurately
model encrypted Skype activity using side-channel properties,
but also reconstruct entire spoken conversations from timing
and size characteristics although it did not generalise well to
variations in speech patterns (e.g. a different regional dialect).
Saponas et al. [35] showed that WiFi-enabled streaming media
devices could be observed to determine which film was being
watched despite encryption and potentially leak the personal
interests of the viewers. This paper adopts a similar strategy:
by observing the activity of specific apps, we can infer personal
information about their users. Furthermore, the mobile aspect of
apps makes opportunities for observation by third parties are far
more likely.
3. Methodology
3.1. Mobile app selection
We selected 34 apps that we would attempt to detect remotely
despite WiFi encryption being employed. At the time of writing,
the apps chosen could be found among the ‘top’ free app listings
in their Play Store category. This is not Android-specific and most
of these apps will have equivalents on alternative platforms. If
we assume that users are representative of an app’s majority
demographic, Table 1 shows how the ability to detect the use
of these apps allows personal information about their users to
be inferred. Inferences may change depending on context so we
assume these apps were identified in a public location such as a
shopping centre in London, UK.
To assess the importance of the information being leaked, we
loosely borrow from the categorisations in EU Data Protection
legislation. Information classified as ‘Personal’ is that which could
be used to identify an individual. While it is not possible to infer
the canonical examples of this category (name and address), other
personal information including gender, age range and nationality
can easily be inferred for the typical app user. Information
categorised as ‘Sensitive’ is personal information where the
importance of additional confidentiality is recognised. If disclosed
such information could be embarrassing, harmful to thewell-being
of the individual, or used as a basis for prejudice. Less personal, but
still intrusive is where use of an app implies a ‘Specific marketable
interest or hobby’. While this may not be particularly important,
it could easily be used to help sell products, target advertising, or
otherwise uncover an individual’s personal interests. Finally, some
appsmay require certain capabilities fromadevice in order towork
(for example, geolocation or a HD screen).
It is important to recognise that these inferences are only
generalisations based on an app’s typical user demographic. They
will likely hold in a majority of cases, but not all. The accuracy of
these inferences can vary. The nationality of a given news source
may correlate with its readers when generalised over all users.
However, for a specific user this is not necessarily the case. An
American may just like to read (UK-based) BBC News as a personal
preference. Similarly, while the majority of AutoTrader users may
be male, there are still plenty of female car enthusiasts and while
most people using dating apps are single, some will be married.
Conversely, the MySugr app is essentially useless to anyone who
is not diabetic so it is highly likely that health information can
be inferred about the user correctly. Furthermore, the precision of
these inferences can also vary depending on the narrowness of an
app’s appeal. While it is impossible to infer the exact date of birth
for a given user, an age range can be inferred depending on the
app. For example, apps may target specific age ranges (e.g. college
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Table 1
User information inferable from use of mobile apps.
students), and many apps provide information that is only of use
to adults (e.g. real estate) and there are many apps designed for
children (although we do not include any).
Popular apps like GMail and Twitter are so widespread that
their use signifies little about the user. News apps on the other
hand can signify nationality based on their origin (BBC News
is British, and New York Times from the US) or language (Le
Monde is French and written in French), and the likely political
leanings of the reader (TheUKnewspapersDailyMail andGuardian
are considered right- and left-wing respectively). BuzzFeed is
social-media based and attracts a certain younger demographic.
Retail apps can inform a great deal depending on their market
specialisation. We chose several from which a user’s likely income
(Aldi and Marks & Spencer are UK supermarkets at low and
premium end of themarket respectively) or gender can be inferred
(The audience of AutoTrader, a car sales app, andGame, a computer
games retailer, will be predominantly male. H&M’s app focuses on
women’s clothing). Religious apps imply the likely religion of a user
that can be linked to common racial or ethnic trends.
Lifestyle apps cover a wide range of personal interests. Dating
apps inform on the probable marital status of the user and age
range (‘young and single’ in the case of Tinder or Grindr). Grindr
further specialises to target gaymen, andDivorcedDating provides
a dating service to a even more specific marital status. YPlan is
an events recommendation service limited to 5 major US and
UK cities at the time of writing. It implies a likely nationality, or
more accurately a likely area of residence. Urbanspoon provides
information on nearby restaurants, Runkeeper is a map-based
fitness tracker and Sky Sports provides sports news. The Lottery
app is used to check numbers from the UK’s (age-restricted)
national lottery, and implies a positive disposition to gambling.
Real Estate apps provide information on the income of a user (i.e.
wealthy and old enough to wish to buy a house) with Sotheby’s
focusing on the very wealthy especially.
Health apps can relay private health information with MySugr
for diabetics and Anxiety United’s app for those who suffer
from anxiety. Period Tracker (a menstruation diary) and I’m
Expecting (a pregnancy app) not only denote health information
but also specific gender and age ranges. Like Twitter and GMail,
as a common activity Entertainment and Travel apps belay little
information with the possible exception that travellers are likely
to be (or accompanied by) adults. However, they do imply the
marketable information that the user has free time at a location and
device capabilities such as HD screen and fast internet connection.
3.2. Measuring app activity
Here we demonstrate the ability to build a classifier that
identifies app usage from the perspective of Fig. 1’s external
observer. The classifier will operate in a scenario without many of
the common network data that act as service identifiers. The likes
of DNS queries, IP addresses, port numbers, and more are hidden
behind encryption from the observer’s perspective. However, the
classifier itself need not be built from data collected from this
vantage point. Previous classification efforts attempted to sample
network data directly from this position [29,31,35]. Although
identical to the scenario that the classifier would operate, this
makes recording accurately labelled samples difficult to coordinate
because the collection platform and device creating the network
traffic have no direct communication method. Synchronising the
capture process with the desired activity depends on the accuracy
of careful timing or artificially-inserted indicator packets.
To avoid the complications of synchronising an external
capture mechanism with on-device app activity, a method was
developed to capture network traffic locally (on the device) then
transform the information to how itwould appear froman external
perspective as the observer would see it. The ‘WiFinspect’ [36]
app was used for this purpose. As an Android-specific interface
for the commonly known TCPDump [37], it saves network data
to standard PCap (packet capture) format for later processing.
The same local sender and receiver MAC addresses, frame size
and timing data that would also be available from an external
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perspective is extracted using TShark from the well-known
Wireshark packet analysis suite [38]. The remainder of the data can
be discarded.
However, we found that this data more than sufficient for
our purposes and greatly simplified the data collection process
so that clean data could be easily gathered in large quantities.
We used Android devices during practical experimentation due
to greater tool familiarity, however it is equally possible to
collect data in similar ways on other mobile platforms (i.e. iOS
or Windows Phone) provided sufficient privileges required to run
packet capture software could be obtained. This usually requires
device rooting.
The network activity observed will differ slightly from the ac-
tivity that would be recorded naturally. For example, information
on Data-Link layer frame retransmissions will be lost and timing
data will vary due to processing delays. A particular device’s net-
work hardware andOS network stackwill also affect exact timings.
The exact distribution of these delays vary by device [39]. How-
ever, they should be nomore problematic than the already variable
Round Trip Times (RTTs) inherent in internet communications [40]
and variation over the 3 different network configurations we use.
The use of cumulativemetrics helpsmitigate this issue as described
below.
We recorded the network activity when launching each app.
Thiswill load some sort ofmain page orwelcomemenu.Depending
on the app, this might trigger network activity for a login or
authentication process, fetch initial content (e.g. latest news or
location-sensitive content), display ads, or report usage statistics
to the developer. Internally, the recorded network activity is
predominantly HTTP or HTTPS (e.g. for authentication) with DNS
alongside to resolve hostnames to useable IP addresses. These
specifics are not used by our analysis as they would be hidden
from an external observer by encryption. However, they are useful
to understand the typical activities of an app at startup. In the
apps surveyed we found that even those with entirely static local
content (like Al-Quran, and Shazam’s home screen) used network
communication at startup when connectivity was available.
Recorded over several weeks with automatic software updates
disabled, our mobile devices were controlled via USB connection
in conjunction with automation software [41]. We therefore
simulated the user actions required to begin packet capture, open
an app, wait until loading is complete, then halt the packet capture
process. This process can then be replayed to generate samples of
app network activity without direct human interaction. Opening
the app is a common, essential but very simple action. This
simplicity is designed to minimise any variation arising from the
differences between automated and human action. This on-device
data is sufficiently close to the off-device equivalent and TShark’s
was configured so that external frame payloads are consistently
reported as 16Bytes larger than their on-device equivalent. By
simply adding an offset to the ‘data length’, these measurements
provide representative characterisation of app activity from an
external observer’s perspective. These measurements can then be
analysed to differentiate mobile app network activity.
In an attempt to build a classifier that would not overfit to
the characteristics of a particular network, samples were collected
from three different types of network. The first was a home
network employing a standard ISP-supplied router to provide
internet access over ADSL. Other devices on the network included
several mobile phones, laptops and media streaming devices. The
second network was the University enterprise-grade network.
This utilised multiple Cisco APs and would operate with over ten
connected devices (predominantly phones and laptops) at any
time. The third was a WiFi network supplied from a 4G ‘MiFi’
dongle providing internet access via a LTE cellular network. Aside
from the tablet whose traffic was being recorded, this network had
no other connected devices. All networks used WPA2 (with PSK
authentication for home and 4G networks, and PEAP-MSCHAPv2
for the enterprise network). Our devices connected at 802.11g
speeds, although all APs also provided b and n data rates.
In total, 7480 app samples were recorded. The 220 recordings
per app consisted of 120 recordings from the home network,
plus an additional 50 each from both 4G network and enterprise
networks. Additionally, 1766 samples of other activitieswere used.
These recordings came from previous work and were composed
of a wide variety of activities including Skype, BitTorrent, web
browsing and idle time, but importantly no mobile apps. This
allowed for the production of a classifier able to predict ‘‘activity
other than that of a known app’’ (denoted ‘other’), and not just
be forced to classify activity as one of the 34 apps. Without
this ability, false positives on any real implementation would be
entirely unavoidable. The generalisation error of this other class
label would also provide a lower limit for false positive detection
rates.
3.3. Random forest construction
To construct a classifier from the available data, we employed
Random Forest machine learning using the BigRF package in R
[42,43]. Popularised by Breiman and Cutler [44], Random Forests
are a supervised, non-parametric machine learning technique and
therefore rely on carefully labelled sample data. As will be detailed
shortly, our samples from encrypted network activity are labelled
as belonging to a particular app (or other). After construction the
Random Forest will be able to predict the app in use (or other)
when given a sample of encrypted network activity.
The accuracy of this prediction process is measured as Out-
Of-Bag (OOB) error. This is a generalisation error based upon the
ability for the Random Forest classifier to correctly classify sets
of test samples. Unlike many other machine learning algorithms,
Random Forests do not require manual separation of data into
these Training and Test sets. This is performed as part of the
construction process. Each tree selects approximately 2/3 of
samples for construction at random and leaves aside 1/3. Unlike
machine learning methods that evaluate error with a single
test following classifier construction, it is therefore considered
unbiased [44].
Random Forests are an ensemble method, formed by building
many Decision Trees. Comparable to the common flowchart, a
Decision Tree is a sequence of nodes anddirectedpaths (‘branches’)
used to predict the class of a given sample. Any route through the
tree starts at a single ‘root’ node and eventually ends at a terminal
‘leaf’ node providing an app prediction. The route (and therefore
the final prediction) taken depends on the outcome of decisions at
each node. Each node compares a variable from the sample data
with a value (as will be demonstrated in the next section). The
outcome of this comparison then determines the branch taken to
the next decision node or terminal leaf.
The best decisions to have at each node are determined as part
of the Random Forest construction process. The measurements
that form each labelled sample allow differences between classes
to be characterised. Each decision attempts to separate the
apps based on their network activity. Providing the tree is well
constructed, the sequences of decisions will cause the available
classes to gradually separate as the path through the tree is
followed. A Decision Tree within the Random Forest is grown as
follows [45]:
1. Generate a new random training subset for each tree:N training
samples with known class labels are taken from the complete
dataset with replacement (a sample can be selected multiple
times).
J.S. Atkinson et al. / Future Generation Computer Systems ( ) – 7
2. Grow the tree: At each node in the tree, select a different
random selection of m variables from the M total in each
sample. The best decision onm to split the N samples by classes
is calculated and used for this node. The value of m is constant
across the entire forest.
3. Terminate with leaves denoting a class: Each tree is grown to
the largest extent possible. Decision nodes are grown until only
a single class remains on a branch. This branch will then lead to
a terminal ‘leaf’ node denoting the relevant class label.
The Decision Trees that constitute the forest attempt to
optimally separate the classes based on random subsets of the
variables and samples provided. Individually their ability to
generalise is poor due to working with only a small fraction
of the available data. However, their predictive power is much
improved when used in combination. This ability is the foundation
of ensemble machine learning methods, where combining many
smaller less accurate classifiers can be easier to construct and just
as powerful as a single monolithic classifier.
3.4. Available data and metric distributions
This method to infer personal information makes no attempt
to break WiFi encryption directly. This results in a highly data-
limited scenario. WiFi encryption is applied at the Data-Link layer.
Therefore the only data available is that contained in the frame
header between device and AP, plus any side-channels we can
measure. We can therefore only gather the following:
• Direction (from broadcast Sender and Receiver MAC addresses
in the 802.11 header)
• Frame Size (measured or read from header)
• Interarrival Time between frames (measured).
However, these measurements can be represented as value
distributions (histograms) and these distributions can be used
to characterise different network activities. For each of the
220 samples of each app, the distributions listed in Table 2
were created. These distributions come in 3 broad categories:
Frame Size, Interarrival Time, and Cumulative Interarrival Time.
Information from these Frame Size and Timing measurements
can then be further refined by separating this data based on the
direction of the observed frames.
The Frame Size (FSize) distribution is created by simply plotting
a histogram of the size of each frame (in bytes). To distinguish
sent and received data, outgoing and incoming frame sizes are
plotted separately. Unlike timing measurements, Frame Sizes are
discrete, exact and not expected to exhibit natural variation due
to jitter, delay or measurement error. Frame Size can be therefore
plotted directly. For efficiency, frame sizes that occur in fewer than
two of the app traffic samples are not provided to the Random
Forest construction process. This is a very low threshold but
nevertheless results in the removal of 1517 redundant variables
so that only approximately half of the 3200 FSize variables are
provided to the Random Forest. This reduces the time required
to build the Random Forest (otherwise the algorithm would have
to learn the unimportance of these variables itself). The size of
this reduction is entirely data dependent. For other datasets (e.g.
different fingerprinting scenarios, or additional apps) the ability to
perform this reduction may be much harder or easier.
Interarrival distributions plot the time period between frame
observations. As a continuous variable, time must be ‘binned’ into
ranges to form a histogram.Weused bins of 3ms, from0 to 150ms.
Again, this information can be partitioned using the direction of
each frame. The combinations of interarrival time measurements
between framedirection result in four distributions: Timebetween
Received frames and the previous Received frame (I-RR); Time
between Received frames and the previous Sent frame (I-SR); Time
Table 2
Distributions created for each 15s window.
Distribution No. variables Description
FSize 3200→ 1683a Frame Size (1600B per direction)
I-RR 50 Rcvd-to-Rcvd interarrival timing
I-RRCum 50 Cumulative transformation of I-RR
I-SR 50 Sent-to-Rcvd interarrival timings
I-SRCum 50 Cumulative transformation of I-SR
I-RS 50 Rcvd-to-Sent interarrival timings
I-RSCum 50 Cumulative transformation of I-RS
I-SS 50 Sent-to-Sent interarrival timings
I-SSCum 50 Cumulative transformation of I-SS
Total 4000→2483a
a FSize subset selected prior to RF construction. See Section 3.4.
between Sent frames and the previous Received frame (I-RS); Time
between Sent frames and the previous Sent frame (I-SS).
Cumulative Interarrival Time plots for each of the Interarrival
Time distribution combinations are also generated as an alterna-
tive representation of the interarrival data. They are identical in
construction, but include the sum of previous (lower interarrival
measurement) bins in addition to the value of the bin itself.
The combined output of these distributions is an array of
2483 integer variables after processing. These distributions can
be generated from labelled recordings of network activity and
used to construct the Random Forest classifier. Alternatively, they
can be generated from observed network traffic (recorded or live)
and provided to the Random Forest to predict the app activity
within. Differences in these distributions per app can be used
to differentiate between the app in use for a given sample. To
demonstrate this, Fig. 2 shows themost important variableswithin
each distribution type (Frame Size, Interarrival, or Cumulative
Interarrival) and plots their respective values for every recording
of 6 different apps. The ability to rank variables by importance is a
useful feature of the Random Forest algorithm.
For example, in most samples the number of sent frames ob-
served with a size of exactly 66 bytes can be used to separate
the BBC and Spotify activity from the other apps shown. The Ran-
dom Forest could use the decision FSize66 > 0. The number of
0–3 ms interarrival measurements between received frames and
the previous sent frame could then further split themajority of BBC
activity from Spotify activity with a decision like ISR1 > 70. Sim-
ilarly, the cumulative number of interarrival measurements be-
tween sent frames that are less than 150 ms, ISSCum50 > 250, can
separate the majority of Tinder samples from Bible samples where
the other variables cannot.
Conversely the patterns shown by The Guardian, RunKeeper
and Tinder are much harder to separate using only these variables.
The decisions to classify these apps can be much more convoluted
and this is why the Random Forest algorithm is used. Of course,
the Random Forest has the entire set of variables to work with but
must classify and separate the characteristics of 34 apps plus other
traffic, not just the 5 apps and 3 variables chosen as examples.
4. Classifier results
Table 3 shows the generalisation error for each app and other
traffic over the collected dataset. As mentioned earlier, it is
important to note that Random Forests do not manually define
Test and Training sets. Therefore, OOB error is equivalent to the
generalisation error reported on the Test set in other machine
learning methods.
Using our method we found that 14 of the apps were identifi-
able with 100% accuracy. The remainder all had less than 9% er-
ror on this sample data with an average app identification rate
of ∼98.5%. The hardest app to identify was GMail with 7.3% er-
ror. GMail was also the app with smallest mean sample filesize.
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Fig. 2. How apps may be differentiated via distribution variables.
Table 3
Random forest generalisation error.
Plotting this data across all sampled apps shows a general trend of
lower error rates as average sample file size increases. This is per-
haps unsurprising; with more bytes of network data to represent
an app’s startup activity, the more characteristics can be discov-
ered and compared to distinguish that activity from others.
While correct app identification rates are very high, the
usefulness of the classifier is limited unless it can be combinedwith
a low false positive rate. The generalisation error for our other
traffic was 8.8%. In real world scenarios the maximum accuracy
possible is therefore greater than 90%. This is encouragingly high
and leaves room for error in real-world scenarios which will
inevitably present more noise and varied activity than our sample
data.
We have shown that the use of specific apps can be accurately
‘fingerprinted’ and identified even when encryption is being used.
As illustrated earlier in Table 1,we can therefore also infer personal
information about the users of these apps when they are detected.
5. Personas and real-time activity detection
Having created an accurate classifier, this section presents
a study into how well the classifier works in real-time on
more varied and noisy real world WiFi communications. A live
analysis was then performed in which we attempted to identify
the apps corresponding to 7 different personas. Personas are a
common user-experience testing and marketing technique that
allow the creation of a realistic (but fictional) representation of
a human individual. As with real individuals, the personas have
their own interests and potentially sensitive characteristics. These
characteristics are expressed in their use ofmobile apps as detailed
in Table 4. The detection of these apps by a passive observer (and
therefore personal information inference) is demonstrated in real-
time and despite WiFi encryption. The Random Forest classifier
created in R was ported, compiled in C++, and directly coupled to
TShark to increase performance. The live detection application is
fast enough that it can analyse the activity of multiple devices in
real-time simultaneously. However, with a singleWiFi adapter this
is limited to devices operating on the same channel.
Table 4
Personas and app-signified characteristics.
Persona name Characteristics (Signifying app)
Prof. Plum (6 apps) A very wealthy (M&S, Sotheby’s) British (BBC)
Muslim (Al-Quran). Commuting (Nat. Rail)
academic with diabetes (MySugr).
Miss. Scarlett (4 apps) Single (Tinder) female (H&M) young adult. Loves
music (Spotify, Shazam).
Col. Mustard (4 apps) Conservative (Daily Mail) member of the British
(Daily Mail) armed forces. Likes fitness
(RunKeeper), football (Sky Sports) and bets
occasionally (Lottery).
Mrs. Peacock (4 apps) French (Le Monde) tourist (Urban Spoon, Trip
Advisor) travelling via train (Nat. Rail).
Mrs. White (3 apps) Divorced (Divorced Dating) commuter (Nat. Rail)
and woman of child-bearing age who is pregnant
(I’m Expecting).
Rev. Green (3 apps) Christian (Bible) man looking to buy/sell his car
(AutoTrader). Resident of London or nearby area
(YPlan).
Dr. Black (3 apps) Gay male (Grindr) of above average income (M&S)
suffering from anxiety (Anxiety Utd.).
As with training data collection, the activities of personas could
be automated for easier repetition. During testing personas would
take a total of 10 actions, actions included opening the apps
belonging to that persona exactly once. In addition to the apps
from our ‘closed-world’, the remaining ‘Extra’ actions would other
activities that used theWiFi connection. ‘Extra’ activities would be
to visit one of a selection of websites at random using the mobile
chrome browser or use another app not included in this study and
provide an ‘open-world’ scenario. Personas would perform all ten
actions in a random (but reported) order.
Every second, the live detection program would take all
network activity observed in the previous 15 s and attempt to
predict the app activity within the traffic for each monitored
device. From our original activity observations, 15 s was the upper
limit of the time required to automatically start recording, open
an app, then stop recording. Without the overhead of starting and
stopping recording and no automation software delay, a real user
would be able to complete these actions much faster. Given that
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Table 5
Live persona detection results.
Monitored activity Activity count
Apps Idle Extra TP FP FN TN FPR (%) Precision (%) Recall (%) Accuracy (%)
Closed-world Apps & Idle 540 1400 – 466 229 74 1171 16.4 67.1 86.3 84.4
Open-world Apps & Extra 540 – 860 466 619 74 241 72.0 42.9 86.3 50.5All 540 1400 860 466 848 74 1412 37.5 35.5 86.3 67.1
detection process was performed every second, it was determined
that the typical app startup activity would usually register 8 s
of positive detection. As a conservative estimate we therefore
used a 5 s minimum threshold for a positive identification of an
app. This helps eliminate spurious momentary app identifications.
These are common in the few seconds before an accurate true-
positive identification. At these points the Forest is recognising that
something besides other traffic is present. However, with only
part of the information because opening the app is still in progress,
the consensus as to which app is present is incorrect. As we know
that opening an app will cause detectable network activity over a
period ofmany seconds, these spurious identifications of 4 s or less
can be discarded.
The 10 actions of each persona were repeated 20 times.
With 3–6 apps each these provided a total of 540 time periods
where mobile apps were launched. The remainder of the observed
activities were 860 additional activities (‘Extra’) that used the
network. Following each activity was a period of idle time before
the next activity began. This corresponded to an additional 1400
‘idle’ time periods with no network activity other than that
caused by background processes. ‘Apps’ and ‘Idle’ activities were
all contained within the training data and therefore constitute a
closed-world scenario. The addition of ‘Extra’ activity provides an
open-world test.
We consider these time periods as single units to provide
an empirical measure of performance as shown in Table 5. The
detector’s output for each timeperiodwas recorded. A true positive
(TP) denotes a period of app activity where the app was correctly
identified. Identification of any app in ‘idle’ or ‘extra’ time periods
would be a false positive (FP), otherwise this would be a true
negative (TN) with no app detected (for longer than the detection
threshold). False negatives (FN) correspond to a period of app
activity occurring but not being detected.Measurement in thisway
groups all app classes together. Although more concise, this does
not show the casewhere app activity is detected but thewrong app
is identified. In Table 5 these are also counted as false negatives
and discussed further below. Similarly, it is important to note that
true positives not only denote correct detection of an app, but also
which one.
The initial closed-world scenario allowed us to demonstrate
detection succeeding in spite of data limitations. We were able
to identify apps despite their communications being entirely
encrypted. In the closed-world the classifier was only required
to detect activities it had previously encountered. If the activity
of a targeted app was present then it was correctly identified in
86.3% of cases despite encryption (high recall). Of the 74 false
negatives 30 (41%) were app activity identified as the wrong app
(with the remainder being identified asother). A false positive rate
of 16.4% results in an overall closed-world accuracy of 84.4%. This
entails a gross lack of privacy for our personas. For example, traffic
patterns from Dr. Black’s device would imply that he is most likely
relatively wealthy, gay, male, and an anxiety sufferer provided
he opened the M&S, Grindr and Anxiety Utd apps whilst under
observation. Although there are occasional false positives,multiple
observations of the same activity on the device would increase the
certainty over time.
When considering the open-world scenario where ‘Extra’
activity (previously unseen by the classifier) was also included,
a substantial increase in false positives was observed. For ‘Apps’
and ‘Extra’ activity alone (i.e. excluding FPs from ‘Idle’ activity)
‘Extra’ activities produced a greatly increased false positive rate
of 72%. Overall accuracy for all activity drops to 67.1% in the
open-world case and only 50.5% when considering only ‘App’ and
‘Extra’ activity. Precision similarly suffers due to this increased
false positive rate at 35.5% and 42.9% respectively. In this open-
world scenario Miss Scarlett’s device would again identify her as
a potential single female who enjoys music via use of the Tinder,
H&M, Spotify and Shazam apps. However, the increased number
of false positives for all apps gives the inference less credibility. A
far greater number of observations of the Tinder, H&M, Spotify and
Shazam apps would need to be made to provide the same level of
confidence in the personal information inferences compared to the
closed-world.
The small number of false negatives means that a negative
detection remains a strong prediction that an app was not used in
either scenario. Unfortunately, this is not very useful information
in context. For example, although Prof. Plum’s use of the Al-
Quran app strongly implies an interest in the religion of Islam, the
converse is not true. Prof. Plummay still beMuslim and not use the
app. However, low false negativesmay be useful in other situations
such as the forensic scenario discussed in the next section.
6. Discussion
Detection in terms of positively identifying the targeted apps
was largely successful. If an app’s network activity was truly
present in live traffic, then the app would be identified with high
recall (true positive rate) and any personal information associated
with that app was demonstrably leaked to the surrounding
area. This means that identifiable patterns that betray personal
information are broadcast frommobile devices whenever an app is
used despite the use of encryption. Sensitive information including
age, religion, sexuality and gender is there to be collected for
anyone listening.
However, in an open-world scenario any positive result from
the detector becomes less meaningful. As indicated by the low
precision score, without improvements to decrease the false
positive rate any positive result has low predictive value. The
usefulness of these results as they stand depends on the scenario
and application.
6.1. Prevention and applications
Although we have demonstrated the ability to infer private
user information despite WiFi encryption, existing techniques to
thwart web fingerprinting methods will still work to mask the
app detection shown in this paper. Specially designed VPNs [46]
and anonymity networks such as Tor [47] pad frame sizes, adjust
timings, and intermix network traffic. However, these methods do
incur significant performance penalties. A network with optimal
throughput will attempt to send data as fast as possible only when
required (causing predictable timings), and only as much data
as is needed (causing predictable frame sizes). Shifting priority
away from maximum throughput introduces significant overhead
by necessity, and is especially problematic for mobile devices
where performance is at a premium due to battery life limitations.
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While these solutions exist, they are unlikely to see widespread
deployment on consumer devices in the short or medium term.
As noted in Section 2.2, mobile devices are already used to
track customer habits. Provided improved false positive rates can
be achieved, it would be possible to infer personal demographic
information from localWiFi users. This kind of inference underpins
the modern practice of ‘‘targeted advertising’’ [13,48]. However,
while shopper footfall tracking may be tolerated, the legality
and ethics of monitoring device communications to add personal
data to this process is questionable and will vary by jurisdiction.
Although not ideal, the simplest solution for concerned users is to
not use apps with an association to sensitive information in public
areaswhere they are likely to bemonitored. However, even if 100%
accurate app detection methods could be achieved, an observer
may still have to procure exact user demographic data for an app
and contendwith the problems of inference accuracy and precision
discussed in Section 3.1.
Law enforcement may also have uses for similar activity
inference, with encryption becoming more common by default.
This is especially true if analysis can be performed in real-time as
it may be able to indicate when a particular system or application
is active leaving volatile data is accessible and encrypted data
unlocked. Similarly, this approach may be a useful supplement to
the forensic analysis of encrypted network traffic in bulk after-
the-fact. The ability to detect specific activity without breaking
encryption can help focus a forensic investigation on certain
devices and time periods without needing to break encryption.
Even with false positives, this may be a more attractive and
tractable prospect than attempting to break the encryption of vast
quantities of streamed data in bulk before it can be analysed.
Finally, this research may lead to increased awareness of how
the privacy guarantees of WiFi encryption are perhaps weaker
than expected. We hope this work will spur interest and the
development of countermeasures appropriate for mobile devices,
such as Tor’s Orbot [49]. Awareness of this security weakness
can allow privacy-conscious users and organisations to recognise
where inference techniques such as this may be a security or
privacy risk and change their usage if appropriate.
6.2. Detector improvement
The greatest impediment to a low false positive ratewere ‘Extra’
activities. While the data from our other dataset contained a
variety of common web traffic and allowed the Random Forest
to usually discount idle (and near-idle) traffic and some of the
added activities correctly, it proved an insufficient baseline to
accurately discount the universe of all traffic outside our targeted
apps’ activities. Future work should look to utilise a larger and
more representative dataset of other traffic. It may also be sensible
to consider a two-tier classification process whereby interesting
activity (i.e. apps) is first separated from all other activity using
a simpler Boolean classifier before any samples classified as
‘interesting’ are passed onto a second classifier specialising in
identifying the correct app. This would partition the problem into
two separate questions that could be tackled separately.
The data used in this study was only sourced from a singleWiFi
data rate at 802.11g (as opposed to 802.11a, b or n). Changing
the rate at which packets could be sent would not affect frame
sizes, but would undoubtedly affect interarrival timings. While
the classifier is unlikely to operate well one different speed WiFi
networks as currently calibrated, we did demonstrate that data
for 3 different types of network allowed for generalisation of
detection over all three. Given that classification operated over a
variety of network types (particularly the 4G dongle), we can have
confidence that the techniques presented in this paper would be
just as effective if training data from networks with different data
rates was sourced.
Furthermore, assuming that frame size and interarrival metrics
are common to both, we can also have confidence that the same
mechanism could be adapted to 4G LTE. This widens the privacy
risk to another widely used and longer range mobile protocol,
but would require more complex hardware for traffic observation
(unlike WiFi, the upload and download protocols are asymmetric
as noted in Stöber et al.’swork). Similarly, althoughwe canmonitor
any number of devices, our observations were limited to only
observing a single WiFi channel (frequency) at a given time. This
is a hardware limitation, but could be overcome by using multiple
WiFi adapters in parallel.
6.3. Practical threat development
Data collection is the main challenge to the development of
an inference system like this. The predictions can only ever be as
good as the sample data provided to the classifier construction
process. Aside from the previously discussed larger dataset of
non-interesting traffic to reduce false positives, every app (or
other interesting activity) must have sufficient sample data for
every permutation of the identification problem. This will require
additional data for every change to the scenario. Random Forests
will not be able to accurately classify something that was not
provided as part of the training process: this approach remains
‘signature-based’.
As noted earlier different data rates will affect interarrival
timings. Although we demonstrated that signatures could be
automated and generalised by sampling a variety of networks
with different throughput capabilities, these samples still need to
be collected. Targeting different WiFi data rates or cellular data
protocols like LTE will require additional data collection for each
network. Alterations to app programming are a potential problem
for the longevity of an app classifier. Typically on-device apps are
automatically updated when a developer publishes to the online
app store or marketplace. While we demonstrated that changes
in content could be overcome by exploiting other similarities (e.g.
changes to the stories in News apps, or different active users on
dating apps), automatic updates were disabled for the purpose of
this study. The impact of an update will be dependent on its effect
(or lack thereof) on the app’s network communications.
For example, while stories featured on the BBC News app
change routinely the ability to detect the app was retained. How-
ever, following the experimentation the Al-Quran appwas allowed
to update. This update changed the ad library in use and caused
such major changes to the app’s network activity that it was no
longer accurately identifiable. Data collection must occur in real
time and is therefore the most time-consuming part of the classi-
fier construction process. Ruiz et al. [50] estimate that ‘‘51%–60%
of free Android apps have at least one ad or analytics library’’, and
that updates to the frameworks the sampled occurred every 1–3
months. Within our dataset only GMail, Twitter, BBC, MySugr and
Aldi did not use a third party library. The remainder all used at
least onewith some appearingmany times (e.g. Scorecard Research
(7 apps), Crashlytics (7), Doubleclick (7), Flurry (6), Crittercism (3),
Facebook (3)). This widespread use is encouraging in that it has not
prevented detection despite reuse of libraries over different apps.
Future work could investigate the variance in signature longevity
in different apps as well as to what degree shared libraries compli-
cate the process. Despite this, the collection of data to create these
signatures can be largely automated and parallelised. User activ-
ity simulation and the ability to convert on-device recordings is
far more practicable than collecting data from an external vantage
point.We hope that future work can investigate exactly howmuch
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variance exists between developers utilising the same 3rd-party li-
braries and exactly how they are integrated into the software. Un-
fortunately most apps are closed source making this significantly
harder.
Although popular, the 34 apps detailed in this paper only
represent a small fraction of entire mobile app market. While
free-to-download apps like the ones used in this study form
approximately 90% the mobile app market [50], there are many
paid apps. For these apps, serving ads or selling information about
their users and is a not their primary business strategy. They may
therefore be less reliant on internet communication. As was seen
with Gmail’s small network activity beingmore difficult to reliably
fingerprint, less or no network activity maymake paid apps harder
to identify. Furthermore, there will be many common libraries and
code shared across apps on the market as a whole. If this common
programming causes network communication – as would be the
case with common functionality such as serving ads, developer
feedback, and mapping services – the resultant activity may be
difficult to differentiate. Using related activities as contextual
clues may help mitigate the problem of different app actions
producing similar signatures. For example, in the Tinder dating
app composing a message must be preceded by first opening the
app and then viewing a profile. Tools such as NetworkProfiler [51]
could allow for all user actions (and therefore all network activity)
paths to be mapped through the app programmatically.
Finally, this study only considered scenarios where one activ-
ity was present at a time. This was seen an appropriate assump-
tion given the modal nature of mobile apps and is a common
assumption in related fingerprinting studies [25]. Although pre-
vious work has shown it is possible [31], simultaneous activi-
ties present a much harder problem. Simultaneous downloads and
other background processes will affect network activity, altering
the observed characteristics and adversely affect detection accu-
racy.
7. Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that private information including the
likes of age, religion, sexuality and gender can be inadvertently
broadcast by mobile device apps despite WiFi encryption being
used as designed. We presented a remote, undetectable, detection
mechanism to infer private user information through observation
of encrypted app network activity. This has been demonstrated
to work in real time, and with appropriate hardware should gen-
eralise to other encrypted communication methods. With longer
range wireless communications becoming more prevalent, and
commercial enterprise becoming more interested in tracking and
analysing publicly broadcast wireless data, this paper highlights a
plausible and demonstrable threat to users’ privacy.
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